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The Ocean Governance Regime
International Conventions and Institutions
ELIZABETH MENDENHALL
Introduction
Like the ocean itself, the international institutions and organizations tasked with
governing maritime activities are sprawling and complex. The contemporary ocean
governance regime comprises the rules, norms, principles, and decision-making pro-
cedures designed to collectively manage the myriad users and multiple uses of the
Earth’s oceans. The regime itself has a rich and storied history, culminating in a flurry
of regime-building activities in the second half of the twentieth century. In general,
ideas about the collective governance of ocean space emerged alongside growth in
human activities on and under the seas, and as the intensity of uses increased, so, too,
did the calls for formulating international consensus about the status of marine space
and maritime resources. This chapter reviews the historical development and contem-
porary status of the ocean governance regime. It lays the foundation for deeper
analyses of climate change and ocean governance in subsequent chapters.
Customary International Law
The basic principles of contemporary ocean governance evolved out of centuries of
state practice and jurisprudential debates, especially among the early modern
Europeans, who elaborated and systematized customary international laws of the
sea. Although Hugo Grotius is widely touted as the progenitor of the “freedom of
the seas” principle, this concept has important antecedents in the ancient Indian
Ocean trading system and Roman ideas about the status of the Mediterranean
(Anand, 1983). A competing principle – the idea of a territorial sea that is owned
and/or controlled by a coastal state – can be traced back to medieval claims over
coastal European seas, and early modern declarations of dominion over broad
swaths of the Atlantic by English and Iberian powers (Fulton, 1976). In his later
works Grotius himself contributed to the idea that any area that could be physically
controlled could be politically claimed, and this more limited notion of the territorial
sea became embedded in state proclamations and practice starting in the eighteenth
century. The contemporary ocean governance regime reflects a balance or compromise
between these two competing principles: freedom of the seas and territorialization.
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Another centuries-old customary international law of the sea is the practice of
national flagging, whereby each ship must fly the national flag of the state under
whose jurisdiction it falls. Although flags and other banners had been used as sym-
bols of affiliation since ancient times, the practice of national registration originated
in early modern Europe as part of taxation schemes related to maritime trade and
was first codified by the British (Mansell, 2009). The “flag state” norm developed in
part through efforts to control and eradicate piracy and privateering during the
modern period. The national flag requirement aided in the identification of pirates,
while defining the flag as a symbol of sovereign jurisdiction, but not sovereign vio-
lence, was a key part of the de-legitimization of privateering (Thomson, 1994).
Although these customary international laws are reflected in the contemporary
ocean governance regime, the bulk of what we now call the “law of the sea” was
negotiated and adopted by the international community in the last century. After
World War II, increasing ocean use prompted a series of unilateral national claims
and caused several visible environmental and ecological disasters. The need for more
detailed and comprehensive rules became apparent, and under the auspices of the
United Nations, the international community constructed a detailed and weighty
architecture to manage the ocean. In particular, the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) serves as a framework or umbrella institution for
ocean governance by empowering, coordinating and complementing other agree-
ments related to maritime activities. This chapter will review this and other basic
components of the contemporary ocean governance regime, focusing on the institu-
tions (bodies of rules and norms), organizations (empowered agencies) and legal
instruments tasked with achieving shared interests and solving collective problems in
the vast ocean.
International Organizations
Several international agreements related to ocean governance were negotiated and
implemented prior to UNCLOS, but most were eventually subsumed or replaced by
it. Two important exceptions are the International Whaling Commission and the
International Maritime Organization, which have evolved and grown alongside and
complementary to the UNCLOS-centered ocean regime. These organizations are
referred to indirectly in the UNCLOS text as “competent international organiza-
tions” through which the duties of state parties can be pursued and fulfilled.
International Whaling Commission
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) was established as a voluntary mem-
bership organization in 1946, with the goal of developing the commercial whaling
industry while avoiding unsustainable whaling practices. In the first several decades
of its operation, the IWC failed to prevent the serial collapse of whale populations.
Its single global quota system (undivided by states) encouraged over-capitalization
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by whalers competing for a diminishing number of whales (Kalland and Moeran,
1992: 12). Specific quotas were difficult to set and enforce. The IWC depended on
unreliable catch information provided by whalers themselves, and cetologists (zoolo-
gists who study whales and dolphins) had neither the data nor the consensus models
required to make authoritative statements about the status of whale stocks
(Peterson, 1992: 161).
In the 1970s, major shifts in the membership and institutional structure of the
IWC changed this approach to the management of whaling. In 1972, the Stockholm
Conference adopted Resolution 33, calling for a ten-year moratorium on commer-
cial whaling. The United States presented this idea to the IWC, where it was rejected
(Miyaoka, 2013: 31). Instead, in 1974 new procedures in the IWC Scientific
Committee mandated the collection of more data and refinement of scientific models
in order to strengthen the relationship between scientific information and decision
making (Peterson, 1992: 164). During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a successful
campaign by environmentalists and anti-whaling governments, especially that of the
United States, encouraged more states to become IWC members. Although many of
these states joined for domestic reasons, their presence tipped IWC decision making
in favor of non-whaling states and anti-whaling interests (Stoett, 1997: 66). By 1982,
the majority of IWC members had no involvement in whaling, thereby shifting the
balance of opinion against whaling. The IWC voted to introduce a moratorium on
commercial whaling starting in 1986.
The moratorium on commercial whaling persists today, although several whaling
states have taken advantage of options to avoid compliance. The IWC rules allow
violations in the case of formal objections. These have been filed by several states.
The moratorium also contains an exception for whaling for the purposes of scientific
research. This has been claimed by Japan, Iceland, and Norway, although the scien-
tific merit of their whale kills is dubious. Another exception is aboriginal subsistence
whaling, which takes place in Greenland, Russia, the United States and St. Vincent
and the Grenadines. Despite these exceptions, the IWC moratorium on commercial
whaling is understood to be durable, and a return to large-scale whaling appears to be
inconceivable in contemporary society (Stoett, 1997: 77). The IWC remains the central
institution for whaling issues, a status reaffirmed in Article 65 of the UNCLOS.
International Maritime Organization
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is an inter-governmental organiza-
tion and a specialized regulatory agency of the United Nations. In 1948, the fledg-
ling United Nations drafted a convention to establish the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), which entered into force in 1958. The
goals outlined in the founding convention focused on promoting free access and
non-discrimination in international shipping, with a secondary interest in maritime
safety. The convention has been modified several times to clarify and extend the
organization’s purview and to alter its functions in line with changes in shipping
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technology and the interests of member states. In the late 1970s, amendments to the
convention deleted the article that described IMCO functions as merely “consulta-
tive and advisory,” added the prevention of marine pollution to the list of goals and
changed the name of the IMCO to the “International Maritime Organization.”
The IMO enjoys broad participation. In addition to 172 member states, 79 inter-
national non-governmental organizations have consultative status. The Assembly is
the IMO’s plenary body and its highest level of decision making, which includes all
member states and meets every two years. The Council is the executive organ of the
IMO, and its 32 member states manage ongoing business between Assembly ses-
sions. Council members are chosen by the Assembly using specific criteria to ensure
representation of states with significant interests in providing and utilizing interna-
tional shipping services, and also geographical representation. Similar mechanisms
to ensure appropriate representation of interested parties are found throughout the
IMO institutional structure. Annual membership dues are calculated using a formula
that emphasizes the tonnage of the registered merchant fleet. Many international
agreements negotiated under the auspices of the IMO have a “double ratification
threshold,” such that a sufficient number of states representing a specific proportion
of global registered shipping must ratify an agreement before it enters into force
(DeSombre, 2006: 74).
The IMO has been described as “quasi-legislative” because it issues codes and
recommendations to its members in addition to sponsoring and hosting inter-
governmental negotiations and supporting implementation of resulting international
conventions (Chircop, 2015: 429). Within the usual functioning of the organization,
IMO member states drive the creation of guidelines, regulations and rules through a
system of committees and sub-committees. All member states may become members
of five main committees: Maritime Safety, Marine Environment Protection, Legal,
Technical Cooperation, and Facilitation. A large number of sub-committees take on
technical work, and within these, non-governmental observers advocate for specific
interests and provide technical expertise (Chircop, 2015: 425). The ongoing process
of updating maritime rules and regulations is facilitated by the IMO’s use of a “tacit
acceptance procedure” for amendments to many of its conventions (Biermann, 2014:
182). Under this procedure, an amendment automatically enters into force unless a
specified number of parties to the original agreement object before a certain date.
The IMO plays a unique role in the ocean governance regime. Its policies shape
the balance between the rights of coastal states and the “freedom of the seas” princi-
ple (Chircop, 2015: 418). For example, the IMO is responsible for evaluating and
adopting ship routing schemes proposed by coastal states for the purpose of enhan-
cing navigational safety and avoiding marine pollution. The organization also places
conditions on the freedom of navigation. Regulations created by the IMO apply to
all kinds of vessels at sea, including fishing boats and cruise ships, and IMO rules
and standards cover all parts of a regulated ship’s life cycle: design, construction,
equipment, operation, and disposal. To improve at-sea monitoring, in 2000 the IMO
made the use of Automatic Identification Systems mandatory for all ships of a certain
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size. Although these technical and operational issues have always been a core function
of the IMO, the organization also promotes access to global shipping services.
One of the most controversial aspects of IMO governance is the so-called “flags
of convenience” problem associated with ship registries. The IMO requires all ships
to be registered in a country and to fly that country’s flag as a signal of registry and
jurisdiction. Around the time of the IMO’s establishment, the practice of “open
registries” became more prevalent. Open registry states allow ships owned and/or
operated by nonnationals to register under their national flag. Such states often
use ship registry as a source of domestic revenue, and attract ships registration with
the promise of lax enforcement of maritime regulations. Due to the existence of
these flags of convenience, the system of flag-state enforcement has been described
as a weakness in IMO governance (Chircop 2015: 437).
Conventions on Marine Pollution
Conventions and agreements negotiated under the auspices of the IMO cover many
topics related to maritime shipping, but those surrounding the issue of marine pollu-
tion have been especially influential in contemporary ocean governance. The right to
pollute was an “implicit freedom of the high seas” for many centuries, but in the 1920s
marine pollution from industrialized and transnational shipping networks began to
arouse international concern (Caldwell, 1990: 294; Vogler, 2000: 57). Attempts in the
1950s and 1960s to regulate oil emissions in the open ocean were thwarted by insuffi-
cient monitoring and lack of infrastructure, and those attempts “had essentially no
impact on improving the marine environment” (Mitchell, 1993: 245).
In the 1970s, two conventions negotiated through the IMO directly addressed the
problems of vessel-source pollution and dumping at sea. The International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) has been lauded
for its innovative and effective requirements for reducing ship-based pollution, both
operational and accidental. The first MARPOL agreement (1973) did not receive
sufficient ratifications to enter into force due to the lobbying efforts of powerful ship-
ping interests in maritime states (Chasek, Downie, and Brown, 2014: 24). After
modifications to assuage the concerns of opponents, a new agreement, fused with
the previous one to become MARPOL 73/78, entered into force in 1983 (DeSombre,
2006: 74).
MARPOL 73/78 introduced design requirements for oil tankers, including moni-
toring devices, separators (to reduce discharge) and segregated ballast tanks. The
1978 amendments to MARPOL added a requirement for washing out tanks with
crude oil itself, instead of water. These changes facilitated new, less-polluting prac-
tices related to ballast exchange and tank cleaning. The MARPOL agreement also
shifted responsibility from operators, who manage at-sea discharges, to owners, who
purchase constructed ships. Because these provisions targeted the technology itself,
instead of its operation, they shifted from the more challenging enforcement at sea
to enforcement in port (Wonham, 1996). In 1997 the MARPOL conference of
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parties adopted a new protocol that limits emissions of air pollutants and the sulfur
content of fuels. The treaty currently covers nearly 98 percent of registered global
shipping, by weight (DeSombre, 2006: 74). The MARPOL agreement is generally
regarded as a success, despite continued challenges with implementation and enfor-
cement in the developing world (DeSombre, 2006: 75; Karim, 2010).
The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter (commonly called the London Convention), also nego-
tiated under the auspices of the IMO, created a “black list” of substances prohibited
from dumping and a “gray list” of substances that could, under particular circum-
stances, be considered for dumping. The London Convention also mandated that
state parties designate an authority to issue permits for all dumping and special per-
mits for dumping of gray-list materials. The IMO is not empowered to monitor or
enforce these rules, but the London Convention was the first agreement to authorize
coastal states to enforce its provisions (Caldwell, 1990, 146; Chasek, Downie, and
Brown, 2014, 24). Article 210 of UNCLOS enjoins member states to adopt national
laws and regulations that are at least as effective as “global rules and standards” for
marine dumping, which has typically been taken to mean the London Convention.
In 1996, a meeting of the parties to the London Convention adopted the London
Protocol, which was intended to modify, update and eventually replace the London
Convention. The London Protocol adopted the precautionary approach by prohibit-
ing all dumping, except of those materials specially authorized by a formal list.
Materials eligible for consideration – after assessment and licensing – include dredged
material, manmade vessels and platforms, fish wastes, and sewage sludge. In addition
to the positive listing approach, the London Protocol contains several other innova-
tions when compared to the London Convention, including enhanced reporting
requirements, a formalized dispute settlement procedure and a slightly broader defini-
tion of dumping. The London Protocol is also more adaptive and dynamic, and it has
included amendments regarding marine geo-engineering (see Chapter 26) and carbon
capture and sequestration in the seabed. Yet despite these advancements, the London
Protocol did not succeed in replacing the London Convention, and it attracted rela-
tively few state ratifications. The two conventions now exist alongside one another in
an unusual informal arrangement described as “two treaties, one family.” The govern-
ing bodies of each agreement typically hold joint meetings, although the majority of
states in attendance have ratified only one of the treaties (Hong and Lee, 2015).
Although MARPOL and the London Convention and Protocol represent signifi-
cant strides in the international regulation and restriction of marine pollution, they
only target pollution from shipping and dumping. Around 70 percent of marine pol-
lution comes from land-based activities (see Chapter 21), which indirectly or unin-
tentionally deposit toxins and debris through wind, river outflows, coastal runoff
and other pathways (Kirk 2015: 526). These sources of marine pollution have
received little international attention in terms of regulation, in part because it was
initially assumed that they would only have local impacts and could be effectively
controlled by coastal states (Kirk 2015: 519).
32 Elizabeth Mendenhall
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (see the chapters in Part V
of this volume), also commonly referred to as the Law of the Sea Convention, is the
centerpiece of contemporary ocean governance. This expansive institution emerged
out of the third (and last) UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which was tasked
with addressing all matters pertaining to the oceans. In the decades following World
War II, a series of unilateral and inconsistent declarations of ownership and jurisdic-
tion over coastal ocean space had confused and complicated the application of cus-
tomary international law. A new consensus was needed to resolve disputes and
confront the phenomenon of “creeping jurisdiction.” The first two Law of the Sea
conferences, in 1958 and 1960, failed to resolve major disagreements about the width
and nature of territorial seas and other jurisdiction zones, or to develop consensus
and produce cooperation around issues related to high-seas fishing.
During the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place from
1973 to 1982, representatives of over 150 states convened on 11 separate occasions
to discuss the terms of UNCLOS. When the conference began, the law of the sea
was in a chaotic state (Beesley, 1983: 183). Existing customary international law
regarding the territorial sea had been called into question, and novel issues regarding
resource use were emerging in the absence of a clear legal regime. As a result, the
agenda for UNCLOS negotiations was very broad, including navigation, fishing,
scientific research, seabed drilling and mining, the laying of seabed cables, marine pol-
lution and territorial and jurisdiction claims. The basic goal was to produce a “pack-
age deal” treaty that would clarify and codify customary international law, establish
new rules for emerging uses and ensure the sustainable and equitable use of ocean
resources. Because of their scope, the UNCLOS negotiations produced diverse and
shifting coalitions from issue to issue. Because of their length, the position of any given
state could change with turnover in government administrations. And because of their
broad international participation, negotiators and diplomats needed to balance a num-
ber of underlying divisions and antagonisms between North and South, East and
West, and coastal, maritime and landlocked states. Despite these challenges, the con-
ference managed to produce a Law of the Sea Convention covering all major issues,
which would eventually win broad support from the international community.
Territory and Jurisdiction Zones
The territory and jurisdiction zones created by UNCLOS are a central feature of its
legacy. These zones specify the duties and rights of various parties and determine
who can legitimately access which resources. The seabed is divided into two types of
zones: the continental shelf, which belongs to the nearest coastal state (up to 350
nautical miles) and “the Area” which is designated the “common heritage of mankind”
and managed by the International Seabed Authority (see later) (Article 136). The water
column is divided into four types of zones: the territorial sea, contiguous zone,
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Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and high seas (also called the “Area Beyond
National Jurisdiction”). In general, the closer a zone is to the coastline, the more
control a coastal state has. This section will briefly survey the basic features of the
water column zones. Seabed zones will be reviewed in the following section, in con-
junction with the instruments created to define and manage them.
The national jurisdiction zones created by UNCLOS are delineated with reference
to the “baseline,” which is normally drawn at the low-tide line as represented by offi-
cial charts of the coastal state (Article 5). Special provisions exist for drawing base-
lines along coastlines with a high degree of topographical variation, and for
archipelagic states made up of a large number of unevenly spaced islands (Article 7
and Article 47). The text of UNCLOS does not specify whether baselines shift in the
case of dynamic coastlines and newly constructed or newly submerged islands (see
Chapter 18 for a detailed discussion).
The territorial sea extends up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline (Article 3).
It is defined as an extension of coastal state sovereignty, and has been recognized as
customary international law even for nonparties to UNCLOS (Noyes, 2017: 94).
Sovereignty over the territorial sea includes the seabed, the water column and the
airspace above the territorial sea, but the exercise of sovereignty is limited. Coastal
states have duties to provide information about hazards and regulations to non-
national ships, and they must allow all navigation that is “innocent passage.” State
parties disagree about whether military ships, nuclear-powered ships and ships carry-
ing hazardous material should qualify as “innocent passage” (Noyes, 2017: 99).
Another condition on sovereignty in the territorial sea applies to the situation of
international straits, through which coastal states must allow “transit passage”
(Article 38). Transit passage through international straits allows submarines to travel
in “normal mode” (submerged) and permits the overflight of nonnational aircraft.
Unlike “innocent passage” in the territorial sea, “transit passage” cannot be suspended
by the coastal state.
Beyond the territorial sea lies the contiguous zone, which can be claimed up to 24
nautical miles from the baseline. In the contiguous zone, a coastal state can “exercise
the control necessary” to prevent and punish the infringement of customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws broken in the territorial sea or on state territory
(Article 33). The coastal state is also empowered to protect objects of “archaeological
and historical nature” within the contiguous zone (Article 303).
The 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone is a novel and extremely significant con-
tribution to the law of the sea. After the initial wave of major unilateral claims from
Latin American states in the 1940s and 1950s, developing and newly independent
states in Africa latched onto the concept of seaward extension of their territorial
rights. In 1972 Kenya presented a working paper titled “Exclusive Economic Zone
Concept” to an Asian-African Legislative Consultative Committee. It was this group
that brought the idea to the UNCLOS negotiations. The EEZ concept was sup-
ported by developing coastal states as a way to protect their offshore resources from
long-distance fishing by developed states (Scott, 2005: 33). The 200-mile EEZ gives
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states exclusive control over water column resources – most notably fisheries – for
the purposes of exploitation, conservation, and management (Article 56) (see
Chapter 18). EEZ jurisdiction is conditioned by the freedoms of navigation, over-
flight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines by other states (Article 58).
States are not obliged to demarcate their EEZs, and those that do may run into deli-
mitation challenges because of overlap with the jurisdiction zones of other coastal
states. The convention offers several options for dispute settlement, reviewed in the
next section of this chapter.
Another area of potential disagreement in the creation of jurisdiction zones is the
status of small islands, such as those found in the South China Sea. Islands that are
“naturally formed” and never completely submerged can generate a territorial sea,
contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental-shelf claim. In contrast, a mere rock that
“cannot sustain human habitation or economic life” can only be used to generate a
territorial sea and contiguous zone (Article 121). State practice regarding the distinc-
tion between rocks and islands is infrequent and inconsistent, such that there is no
clear interpretation of UNCLOS and no coherent customary international law
(Churchill, 2005: 106).
The “high seas” encompass all parts of the ocean that fall outside the other juris-
diction zones (Article 86). All states have rights to navigation, overflight, laying of
cables and pipelines, construction of artificial installations, fishing, and scientific
research, among other activities in the high seas (Article 87 provides a non-
exhaustive list). The convention invalidates any sovereignty claims in the high seas,
and it reserves high-seas areas for “peaceful purposes” (Article 88). Enforcement of
international and national law on the high seas is the purview of “flag states.” There
is a limited “right of visit” for a warship if it suspects that a nonnational ship is
engaged in piracy, slavery or unauthorized broadcasting, or if the ship is without a
nationality (Article 91 and 110).
Instruments for Implementation
Several UNCLOS provisions associated with navigation, safety, and pollution obli-
gate states to observe the rules of preexisting treaties and organizations. The conven-
tion also created three new instruments to facilitate implementation and resolve
disputes among state parties: the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International
Seabed Authority. The features and functions of these institutions help make
UNCLOS an evolving and adaptive institution.
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is a technical
organ established by Annex II of the convention. Its purpose is to make recommen-
dations about the application of Article 76, which uses a complex and highly techni-
cal formula for the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf. Coastal
states have the exclusive right to exploit the natural resources of their continental
shelves (Article 77), so they have an incentive to maximize their continental-shelf
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claims. The 21 members of the CLCS are persons elected by states parties every five
years, and those members must be experts in geology, geophysics or hydrography.
Although the treaty does not precisely specify representational criteria for CLCS
members, the parties have implemented an equitable geographical distribution
scheme in the members’ selection process. Commission members “serve in their per-
sonal capacities,” and each member is funded by the state party that nominated that
person for election (Annex II, Article 2). The convention also encourages the CLCS
to cooperate and exchange scientific and technical information with other expert
bodies, including the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO
and the International Hydrographic Organization (Annex II, Article 3).
States seeking recommendations on the outer limits of their continental shelves
must submit their claims and supporting scientific information to the commission
within ten years after the convention enters into force for that state (Article 4). Since
UNCLOS entered into force, the meetings of the states parties have effectively
amended this provision to extend the deadline for submissions and to allow the sub-
mission of preliminary information to be considered and commented upon before
the final submission (Churchill, 2017: 43).
In addition to the commission, UNCLOS provides multiple options for the settle-
ment of disputes among its member states. These include adjudication by the
International Court of Justice, two types of international arbitration and submission
to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as established in Annex VI
(Article 287). Although states are obligated to resolve disputes via peaceful means,
they are also permitted to exclude some issues from compulsory dispute settlement,
including maritime boundary disputes and military activities (Article 298).
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has ruled on 25 cases
and issued two advisory opinions since its instantiation. Like the CLCS, the tribunal
is made up of 21 members with demonstrated competence in their subject matter (in
this case, legal affairs) and representing an equitable geographical distribution and
the “principal legal systems” of the world (Article 2). Tribunal members are nomi-
nated by state parties and elected to nine-year terms by secret ballot. A quorum of
11 members is required to constitute ITLOS, and decisions are made by a majority
of those ruling on a case. The jurisdiction of the tribunal is broad, comprising “all
disputes and all applications submitted to it in accordance with [UNCLOS]”
(Article 21). It also has special jurisdiction over provisional measures while cases are
pending and over situations requiring “prompt release” of seized vessels and crews
(Articles 290 and 292). Its rulings are only binding between parties to a dispute, and
they are not intended to set more general precedents (Annex VI, Article 33).
The creation of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) was the subject of pro-
longed contention during UNCLOS negotiations (Hollick, 1981: 287). The designa-
tion of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction as the “common heritage of
mankind” – formally affirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2749 in 1970 –
required the creation of a central institution to manage seabed resource develop-
ment. The ISA is established within Part XI of UNCLOS, which covers all activities
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in the area. Its basic purpose is to “organize and control activities in the Area, particu-
larly with a view to administering the resources of the Area” (Article 157). In effect,
the ISA’s role is to manage seabed mining in the Area Beyond National Jurisdiction.
The ISA is an autonomous institution that became fully operational in 1996. Its
principal organs are an assembly, a council and a secretariat, all headquartered in
Kingston, Jamaica. All state parties to UNCLOS are automatically members of the
ISA, and all ISA members can designate one representative in the assembly. In addi-
tion to the adoption of general policies, the assembly elects 36 members that com-
prise the council. The members of the council must be elected from within five
different categories: the largest consumers of minerals (four members), the largest
investors in seabed mining (four members), the largest exporters of minerals (four
members), developing countries with “special interests” such as large populations or
land-locked status (six members) and whatever countries need to be placed on the
council in order to achieve geographical representation (18 members) (Article 161).
For disputes related to seabed mining, ITLOS convenes a specific Seabed
Disputes Chamber composed of 11 members of the tribunal, with a quorum thresh-
old of 7 members. The Seabed Disputes Chamber has special jurisdiction over activ-
ities in the area, including disputes between state parties and the International
Seabed Authority (Article 187). In its rulings, the chamber is empowered to apply
“the rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority” and “the terms of contracts
concerning activities in the Area” (Annex VI, Article 38).
Implementing Agreements
Alterations to UNCLOS began before the convention entered into force in
November 1994. Two “implementing agreements” were intended to rectify gaps and
problems identified in UNCLOS (Harrison, 2011: 86). The first agreement – the
Implementing Agreement on Part XI – emerged from four years of informal negotia-
tions spearheaded by the UN Secretary General. There was major concern that
UNCLOS would fail to achieve widespread acceptance – of the first 60 states to ratify
UNCLOS, 58 were developing countries. The original provisions on seabed mining in
Part XI were perceived as a central barrier to universal participation in UNCLOS,
and the agreement aimed to win over nonparty industrialized countries who specifi-
cally objected to this section. The final implementing agreement amended Part XI of
UNCLOS in order to strengthen the position of private investors and weaken the role
of the enterprise. This included watering down provisions aimed at benefit sharing,
including technology transfer and the taxation and redistribution of mining profits.
The July 1994 Implementation Agreement on Part XI was adopted by the UN
General Assembly as a resolution and was combined with the original convention
“to be interpreted and applied … as a single instrument” (A/RES/48/264). The
agreement is therefore only open to those states that have already ratified
UNCLOS, and any state that ratifies UNCLOS after the agreement was adopted
must consent to be bound by both. In other words, states that ratified UNCLOS
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before July 1994 had to “opt in” to the implementing agreement, and states that
ratified after July 1994 could not “opt out” of the agreement. Thus far, 146 states
have ratified the implementing agreement in Part XI.
The second implementing agreement did not nullify, replace or amend any parts
of UNCLOS, but rather clarified, elaborated, and modernized the provisions relat-
ing to fisheries management. The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the Convention Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and High Migratory Fish Stocks (“Fish Stocks Agreement”)
focused on the regulation of highly migratory fish stocks and those that straddled
the national jurisdiction zones created by UNCLOS (see Chapter 11). (Unlike the
Implementing Agreement on Part XI, the Fish Stocks Agreement is a freestanding
treaty that can be ratified by nonmembers of UNCLOS. It entered into force in
2001, and currently has only 82 member states.) The original convention simply
enjoined states that fished for straddling or migratory stocks to cooperate over their
management (Articles 63 and 64). This requirement was seen as inadequate for effec-
tive governance, a fact that was formally acknowledged in the Agenda 21 document
produced by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. In 1993,
the UN General Assembly convened a UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Stocks, which after three years of negotiations adopted the
Fish Stocks Agreement by consensus in August 1995. The agreement was welcomed
and promoted by UN General Assembly Resolution 50/24.
The Fish Stocks Agreement reaffirms the duty of states to cooperate in fisheries
management and to use the best scientific evidence available (Article 119). It adds
two principles of sustainable development to UNCLOS: the precautionary approach
and the ecosystem approach. The Fish Stocks Agreement obligates states to consider
uncertainty in scientific information about fish stock size and reproduction, and the
impact of other marine activities on target and non-target species alike. It also
requires states to generally “protect biodiversity in the marine environment” [Article
5(g)]. The Fish Stocks Agreement explicitly addresses the functions and features of
regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) (described in detail in the
next section; see also Chapters 9 and 10). One of the most controversial elements of
the Fish Stocks Agreement restricts fishing in RFMO-governed areas, or fishing of
RFMO-governed species, to those states that are RFMO members [Article 8(4)].
Member states are also empowered to engage in enforcement actions against non-
member states violating RFMO dictates (Articles 21 and 22). Some nonparties to
the Fish Stocks Agreement argue that these provisions undermine the principles of
freedom of the high seas and flag-state jurisdiction (Molenaar, 2011).
Upon the completion of the UNCLOS III conference, the president of the confer-
ence (Tommy Koh of Singapore) declared the creation of a “comprehensive consti-
tution for the oceans which will stand the test of time.” The description of
UNCLOS as a “constitution” is appropriate given its comprehensive scope, wide-
spread participation, hierarchical relationship to other institutions and embeddedness
in the overall ocean governance regime (Churchill, 2017: 45). Although the convention
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certainly has its failings, there is currently no significant interest within the interna-
tional community to replace or significantly revise UNCLOS.
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
RFMOs are autonomous organizations formed by agreement between a group of
members that self-regulate their exploitation either of a particular species or of all
commercial species within a particular area. Some RFMOs only have an advisory
function, but most have a management function. They are open-membership, and
they only create legal obligations for their members. There are around 18 RFMOs
(the exact number depends on the criteria used), and they have become the preferred
vehicle for fulfilling UNCLOS obligations related to the conservation of living
resources (Article 117 and 118) (Rayfuse 2015: 440). Although each RFMO is differ-
ent, common management tools include data collection, dispute settlement and lim-
itations on fishing technology, capacity and effort.
RFMOs are widely understood to have failed at their primary task: maintaining
the sustainability of fisheries (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, 2010). Although the Fish
Stocks Agreement requires the adoption of a precautionary and ecosystem-based
approach, RFMOs remain deeply flawed and have only made negligible progress in
adherence to these principles (Gilman, Passfield, and Nakamura, 2014). Fisheries
management organizations are particularly subject to the problem of “regulatory
capture,” whereby regimes are controlled by vested interests seeking to justify exist-
ing practices (Gjerde et al., 2013; Barkin and DeSombre, 2013). Many flag states
simply do not become members of the RFMOs that regulate the fisheries that their
nationals exploit. But fishers from RFMO member states can easily register in
nonmember states to avoid regulation (Barkin and DeSombre, 2013: 32). Although
the Fish Stocks Agreement authorizes RFMO member states to enforce RFMO pro-
visions against nonmember states, this only applies to situations where the non-
member of the RFMO is a member of the Fish Stocks Agreement (Molenaar, 2011:
205). In general, little or no effort is made to keep nonmember fishers out of an
RFMO area. The problem of RFMO management is summarized succinctly by
Samuel Barkin and Elizabeth DeSombre (2013: 9): “a common pool resource cannot
be successfully protected by a sub-group of users.”
Advances in fisheries management aim to redress the insufficiency of RFMOs.
Efforts have focused on making ships more traceable at sea and more accountable
in port. The 2009 Food and Agricultural Organization Port State Measures
Agreement has the explicit goal of blocking the flow of IUU (illegal, unreported,
and unregulated) fish into markets. It allows port states to deny entry to foreign
boats suspected of illegal fishing and to require detailed documentation and inspec-
tion to ensure the legality of catches. Despite these efforts, the persistence of “flags
of convenience” and “ports of convenience” make effective governance of global
fisheries an extremely difficult task (see Part III of this volume).
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Conclusion
The heavy and complex architecture of the contemporary ocean governance regime
represents decades, even centuries, of investment in diplomacy and legalization.
Although lauded for its comprehensiveness and universality, the UNCLOS-centered
regime can be criticized for its lethargic response to emerging issues associated with cli-
mate change (see Chapter 20). In particular, jurisdictional boundaries tend to assume
that the ocean will not change fundamentally. The law of baselines, from which the terri-
torial sea and EEZ are calculated, does not account for the possibility of a dynamic
coastline. Whether the baseline shifts with rising seas remains an open question (see
Chapter 18). The “regions” of RFMOs reflect the spatial extent of fish populations and
fishing practices, which may shift in response to warming seas (see Chapters 12–14).
Even the most successful parts of the contemporary governance regime fail to address
risks associated with climate change. The London Convention and MARPOL are nar-
rowly focused on vessel-source pollution, without any provision for land-based or atmo-
spheric sources of harmful emissions that cause acidification. In general, current
environmental protection efforts aim to prevent over-exploitation by human users, with
little attention to more diffuse threats to marine habitats like warming and acidification.
The breadth and depth of UNCLOS represents a substantial “sunk cost” for the
international community. Because there is little international enthusiasm for replace-
ment or substantial reform, collective problems must be addressed within the basic
framework established by UNCLOS (see Chapter 16). Whether adjustments and
augmentations to the existing regime will be sufficient to confront issues associated
with climate change promises to be a key question for the twenty-first century.
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